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During the July 2017 G-20 diplo-matic summit in Hamburg, one of the discussion points between Don-
ald Trump and Vladimir Putin was Russian 
intervention in the 2016 US presidential 
election, elevating the issue to multilateral 
diplomatic setting.1 This article discusses 
statecraft behind this type of intervention. 
In particular, it discusses the advancement 
of Russian propaganda in cyberspace. The 
central argument of this discursive article is 
built on the discussion of unique features in 
Russia’s statecraft, namely, the hybridization 
of “hard” and “soft” power. Further, this ar-
ticle discusses how kompromat (a portman-
teau signifying “compromising materials”), 
a feature of Russia’s political culture, under-
lies its approach to exercising soft power in 
cyberspace, and drives the advancement of 
Russia’s propaganda in cyberspace to further 
the Kremlin’s diplomatic ends.
In the recent years, Russian soft power 
has been thought of as lacking coherence, 
while its statecraft enjoys a multilayered ar-
chitecture. On a surface level, Russia pres-
ents itself as magnanimous and pragmatic 
leader, using its media mouthpieces of RT 
(formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik, and 
promoting Russian culture globally through 
the agencies Russkiy Mir and Rossotrud-
nichestvo. More recently, however, global 
audiences have been learning more about 
the dark side of Russian influence in inter-
national politics: Russia’s aiding the prolif-
eration of “fake news,” cyberattacks, and 
kompromat.2 This article will illustrate how 
Russia uses these digitalized means of at-
traction and coercion to create destabilizing 
effects. It will argue that countering these 
cyberattacks and kompromat-inspired cam-
paigns is complex and requires several types 
of policy initiatives and responses.
Hybridizing Soft Power
Russia might be perceived as a wonderful 
state if imagined through the prism of its 
cultural legacies: it has a rich and diverse fine 
arts heritage, the Bolshoi Ballet, and an in-
credible film industry, capable of capturing 
the imagination of international audiences 
with films such as Leviathan (2015)—all 
three are truly exciting sources of soft power, 
which Western liberals usually warm up to. 
The contemporary Russian soft power draws 
from the full potential of what it can offer 
the world: in autocratic Russia, Putin’s me-
dia is packaged for global audiences in a lib-
eral “sugarcoating of a sweet and sour flavor” 
through a mimetic mix of strategies, includ-
ing RT’s international broadcasting. Rus-
sia has given the West a taste of attraction 
and coercion as its soft power assets. With 
government spending on communicative 
resources of soft power exceeding spending 
on social policies combating unemploy-
ment, Putin’s Russia aims to reestablish its 
global influence and, on the way, reinvent 
strategies for doing so.3
“Soft power” refers to the means of in-
fluence by “non-material capabilities such 
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as reputation, culture, and value appeal that 
can aid attainment of a state’s objectives.”4 
Digital media technologies offer new means 
to pursue these ends as states strive to adopt 
innovative strategies in the ongoing race for 
influence.5 Given that the future of diplo-
macy is inextricably linked to digital me-
dia technologies,6 one of the consequences 
of this process is the hybridization of soft 
power statecraft. Hybridization is hardly 
new in diplomacy: after all, Western pub-
lic diplomats who are typical front-liners 
in exercising soft power on behalf of their 
governments had to adapt to changing me-
dia landscapes. Private-sector consultants 
facilitated the emergence of new trends in 
statecraft by hybridizing, for example, pub-
lic diplomacy and nation branding and by 
advancing the process of corporatization of 
soft power.7 
In the case of contemporary Russia, hy-
bridization of soft power is unique because 
it is made out of a blend of political culture 
features, such as kompromat, and propagan-
distic strategies that are tailored to specific 
media landscapes. While the pioneer of the 
concept, Joseph Nye, argues that propa-
ganda is not the way to advance influence 
in international relations, communicative 
resources are integral to soft power.8 Russia 
is one of the players adapting its commu-
nicative capabilities to match its ambitions 
and treating contemporary international re-
lations as a playground for state-facilitated 
or state-sponsored articulations of soft 
power strategic narratives in cyberspace. 
The uniqueness of Russia’s approach to soft 
power is consistent with Putin’s views on 
making foreign policy “through informa-
tion and other means of influence,” further 
recognizing that “these methods are often 
used to encourage and provoke extremism, 
separatism, nationalism, manipulation of 
public sentiment, and outright interference 
in the internal affairs of sovereign states.”9
Perhaps not coincidentally, there is 
no adequate translation of the term “soft 
power” into the Russian language. The 
phrase “мягкая сила” translates ad litteram 
as “soft force” and arguably captures what 
Russia aims for in international politics: a 
hybrid of “forceful persuasions,” articulated 
less to be “liked” by the West and more so 
to be seen as an “equal” player. Russia’s ap-
proach to diplomacy and statecraft favors 
security over democracy, uses soft power 
capabilities instrumentally by adopting de-
stabilizing strategies and tactics, and often 
deploys them to cover up its information 
warfare in cyberspace. Russia is turning into 
a “spoiler power,”10 pushing the boundaries 
of the application of digital media technol-
ogy in statecraft and advancing digital espio-
nage. While the revelations about Russian 
intervention into the 2016 US election are 
still open to scrutiny, this event, combined 
with Donald Trump’s foreign policies, car-
ries beneficial propaganda value for Russia: 
it undermines liberal democracy and reveals 
weaknesses of the United States as a global 
power. 
Putin’s Russia aims to reestablish 
its global influence and, on the way, 
reinvents strategies for doing do.
The uniqueness of Russia’s approach 
to soft power is consistent with Putin’s 
views on making foreign policy  
“through information and other  
means of influence.”
Perhaps not coincidentally, there is no 
adequate translation of the term “soft 
power” into the Russian language.
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Digitizing Propaganda and  
Soft Power 
I belong to the transitional generation of 
Europeans who, during the final stages of 
the Cold War, were exposed to the Soviet-
styled propaganda in our everyday lives. 
As a citizen, I witnessed systemic changes 
in Central and Eastern Europe, including 
shifts in the ways in which the Soviet Union 
interacted with citizens of the “bloc” and 
the way the influence of its communication, 
arts, cultures, and political ideas faded after 
1989. I then went on to study propaganda 
in Britain, and after a while I realized that 
my experience gave me an advantage in 
terms of detecting iterations of propagandis-
tic practices and different propaganda styles, 
including those exercised across national 
boundaries. In the past year or so, I have 
been strangely alerted to the news media 
reports about the growing amount of Rus-
sia’s “soft power-styled” activities in Europe. 
More recently, the revelations about Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 American presi-
dential election felt like a flashback to my 
youth. I immediately recognized the use of 
kompromat as the cultural underpinning of 
this complex foreign policy issue. The scope 
and style of Russia’s soft power is becom-
ing increasingly problematic for democratic 
governance in liberal parts of the world. As 
a professional, I found it fascinating. As a 
European, I was deeply worried.
In its soft power, Russia has been increas-
ing its digital media technology capabili-
ties, and its statecraft has been responding 
fast to changes in global media landscapes. 
According to Alexander Yakovenko, Rus-
sia’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, 
his state has joined the club of “Twiplo-
macy of great powers” relatively recently, 
but in terms of adoption of its capabilities 
and levels of public engagement, Russia 
matches activities of the US and Israel. The 
Russian Foreign Ministry came up with 
its own term—“innovative diplomacy”—
which it interprets as a “tool of Russian 
foreign policy to exert influence on public 
opinion through the use of ICT.” Putin 
himself urged Russian diplomats to use digi-
tal media technologies across multiple plat-
forms, including in social media, to explain 
Russia’s foreign policies.11 
The speed with which Russian soft power 
statecraft adapted to an increasingly dy-
namic and flux global media landscape is 
impressive. For example, investing in com-
municative resources such as the “Kremlin 
School of Bloggers,” expanding the social 
media capabilities of RT, growing networks 
aiding cyberspace campaigning, advancing 
IT expertise, and shifting cyberspace strate-
gies toward attacks and espionage12—all are 
powerful indicators that Russia is a highly 
capable actor. Correspondingly, there is a 
growing amount of foreign media cover-
age, policy reports, and scholarship (e.g., 
Reframing Russia for Global Media Sphere 
at the University of Manchester) revealing 
the inner workings of Russian soft power in 
cyberspace. For example, in an article titled 
“Russia Is Attacking Western Democra-
cies,” Gerodimos and his colleagues collated 
some evidence of media stories on Russian 
cyberattacks and strategic interventions in 
domestic politics.13 Among the listed tar-
get locations of Russia’s cyberattacks are 
Germany, France, the Czech Republic, the 
United Kingdom, Finland, Greece, Poland, 
Estonia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Hun-
gary, Austria, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and, 
finally, the United States. The intervention 
in election campaigns has been reported in 
Germany, France, Bulgaria, and the United 
States and often has the intention to aid 
certain political parties, often seen as fringe 
movements. According to the European 
Council on Foreign Relations, these parties 
tend to adopt pro-Russian foreign policy 
stances.14 Among examples of political party 
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vehicles for such policies is Alternative für 
Deutschland in Germany. While Russia and 
the targeted group of European parties en-
joy different depths of relationships, their 
campaigning tends to have polarizing effects 
on politics in Europe.
It is worth noting that innovations in 
media technologies led to the redefinition 
of the way we think about soft power state-
craft: for example, in the 1990s, the “CNN 
effect” underpinned the theory and practice 
of public diplomacy. Nowadays, digital di-
plomacy is being recognized as a semiau-
tonomous practice, but as a field of inquiry, 
it has some way to maturity.15 The prolifera-
tion of digital media technologies has cre-
ated new, often pathological, opportunities 
for advancing influence in international pol-
itics. The widespread usage of blogs, bots, 
and trolling mixed with “fake news” under-
pins a propagandistic offensive that has used 
digital media to position Russia as a threat 
to Western liberal governance.16 In its soft 
power, Russia uses digital media to project 
its stance on socioeconomic development, 
culture, and military operations. Given 
the skillful hybridization of foreign policy 
statements with digital activities in cyber-
space, Russia’s soft power carries an asser-
tive strategic narrative visible, for example, 
in Ukraine where a “pro-Russian, anti- 
Western” narrative competes with a “pro-
Western, anti-Russian” narrative projected 
from Kiev.
Risks for Liberal Democracy: 
Kompromat-Inspired Propaganda
It took post–Cold War Russia a while to 
centralize its soft power capabilities, but by 
2014, as noted in a Chatham House report, 
“Russian information campaigns displayed 
close coordination of messaging as well as 
an impressive range of alternative outlets to 
address all sectors of the target audience.”17 
RT, Sputnik, Russia Direct, and others 
each tailored their level of argument. In 
the light of the cyberattacks on the White 
House, the Clinton-DNC attack, and the 
WikiLeaks release of 20,000 emails before 
the Democratic National Committee, the 
cyberhacking group APT28 was believed to 
act on behalf of Russian state principals.18 
These activities show how, on the one hand, 
Russia centralizes its soft power on the level 
of governance and how, on the other hand, 
it decentralizes its tactical propaganda op-
erations. Consequently, the intervention of 
Russia, or any other actor, into domestic 
politics should be analyzed as digital espio-
nage instead of digital diplomacy.
These kinds of cyberattacks find roots, 
I argue, in Cold War–style espionage and 
political blackmail. What makes the key 
difference between traditional espionage 
and digital espionage is kompromat, which, 
thanks to the recent dossier on Donald 
Trump, has gained widespread media at-
tention. This peculiarity of Russian political 
culture illustrates the strong public dimen-
sion of digital espionage that is absent from 
traditional espionage. Kompromat is a flex-
ible and powerful concept. It enables denial 
(rarely apologia) of any wrongdoing when 
uncovered. Additionally, it often reveals 
falsehoods and lies about political or busi-
ness opponents along with truthful nega-
tive information, blending accuracies and 
misinformation, thus allowing it to damage 
its targets in a highly sophisticated man-
ner. With the hacking of the Democratic 
National Committee, the undercurrents of 
kompromat were also explicit in the 2016 
US election campaign.19 Furthermore, Pres-
ident Trump’s tendency to promote theories 
that are not supported by evidence might 
explain why kompromat-inspired propa-
ganda resonates well among his supporters. 
It is clear that kompromat has entered the 
news media cycles of liberal democracies, 
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but what is not clear is how these countries 
will respond to it. 
How Should Liberal  
Democracies Respond? 
A starting point for the development of re-
sponses to the wave of kompromat-inspired 
propaganda is policymakers’ and citizens’ 
awareness of Russian political culture and 
the effects digital media technology might 
have on soft power. In cultural terms, Russia 
displays clear-cut attitudes on foreign policy 
toward the West, highly polarized domes-
tic politics, and instrumentalization of the 
value of public opinion in governance—all 
of which enable kompromat to function with 
ease. In this cultural milieu, Russian media 
autocracy oftentimes resorts to communica-
tive practices rooted in the Soviet past. Be-
cause the Russian state plays a powerful role 
in citizens’ lives, there is a tendency among 
its citizens to take government’s commu-
nication practices for granted or oppose it 
all together. This aspect of Russian political 
culture translates to strategic communica-
tion for soft power: in responding to Russia’s 
kompromat-inspired propaganda, the United 
States and other actors need to develop 
strategies for enhancing credibility instead 
of engaging in hybridized propaganda wars.
The Russian cyberattacks in the United 
States and in Europe bring us to the issue 
of the role of technology in responding to 
particular negative effects of digitalized 
propaganda. A report by Chatham House 
states, “Misconceptions about the nature of 
Russian information campaigns, and how 
best to counter them, remain widespread—
in particular, the notion that successful 
counter-measures consist in rebutting ob-
vious disinformation wherever possible.”20 
This approach is problematic for at least two 
reasons: organizational and efficacy issues. 
There is a risk that countering kompromat-
inspired propaganda head on will lead to the 
proliferation of the very information one is 
trying to counter in cyberspace. Because re-
ports about Russia’s involvement in destabi-
lizing cyberspace emerged among multiple 
states and locations, challenging these ac-
tions require cyber diplomacy—that is “the 
use of diplomatic tools, and the diplomatic 
mindset—to resolve issues arising in cyber-
space.”21 The first lesson in responding to 
Russia’s propaganda campaigns is the inter-
nationalization of this issue by, for example, 
the formation of a diplomatic coalition to 
counteract Russia’s actions. 
Unfortunately, while some governments 
have already introduced institutional mea-
sures to unravel the dynamics of Russian 
disinformation campaigns, they still seem 
to operate in silos. For example, in early 
2017 the Czech governments set up the 
Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Treats 
and entrusted it with the task of challeng-
ing radicalization and destabilization cam-
paigns. The agency is seen as an example to 
follow for other democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Similar governmental units 
are needed, especially among states in which 
Russia is looking to revisit its political, eco-
nomic, or security priorities. Whether the 
United States can be a credible leader of this 
type of coalition depends on political devel-
opments at home so that they don’t over-
shadow cyber-diplomacy efforts.
Apart from the formation of a diplomatic 
network, the EU External Action Service’s 
East StratCom Task Force should be strength-
ened by additional capacity and capabilities. 
While this EU diplomatic body declares that 
Furthermore, President Trump’s 
tendency to promote theories that are 
not supported by evidence might explain 
why kompromat-inspired propaganda 
resonates well among his supporters.
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it “corrects information,” the approach of this 
group (and similar national bodies) should 
focus on unraveling the ways in which Rus-
sian kompromat-inspired campaigns have 
been designed and on using media relations 
to report on them rather than fighting false-
hoods head on. In this approach, knowledge 
exchange between security services, NATO, 
government agencies such as the one in 
the Czech Republic, and think tanks (e.g., 
Chatham House) is critical in discrediting 
theories of conspiracy and personalized cy-
berattacks on politicians. In addition, the 
US and EU policymakers should be proac-
tive in the development of transparent media 
relations response strategies. After all, their 
reputations are at stake if they fall victim to 
kompromat-inspired propaganda.
Apart from cyber-diplomacy efforts, the 
American media and its regulators can play 
a proactive role in counterbalancing Russian 
campaigns. US media broadcasters should 
monitor the media landscape and facilitate 
gaining information access to news sources. 
National broadcast regulators can also play a 
significant role in ensuring that information 
carried in national media markets by the 
external media is produced in accordance 
with professional journalistic standards. In 
the case of the United Kingdom, Russia’s 
RT has been a subject of the investigation 
by a national regulator, Ofcom, and it has 
been sanctioned for misleading reporting. 
The existing evidence suggests that national 
regulators certainly can do more to inform 
media audiences about the ownership of 
external media—for example, the fact that 
RT is owned by TV-Novosti and hence the 
Russian state.22
To challenge the speed with which pro-
paganda is disseminated, investigative jour-
nalism should be more proactive. While 
Western broadcasters report on Russian 
campaigns, those news media stories tend 
to be reported as isolated cases, and given 
the complexity of the issue, their analysis 
should be aided with extra resources. Con-
sequently, national media regulators, me-
dia organizations, and journalists should 
pay more attention to cybersecurity. Apart 
from policy-focused measures, professional 
standards should be encouraged: for ex-
ample, initiatives bringing together Western 
journalists, public diplomacy experts, and 
Russian diplomats should be facilitated by 
governments and media organizations as a 
policy measure for advancing dialogue be-
tween the two environments.
Finally, it has to be noted that Russia’s soft 
power is relational, and so far, it has been dif-
ficult to talk about Russian grand soft power 
strategy. Undeniably, although with varying 
levels of success, Russia has managed to 
make some inroads into capturing the at-
tention of some of the international public 
thanks to nationally focused strategic nar-
ratives about a shared past, challenging the 
features of the liberal international system, 
fueling polarizing populist agendas and ac-
tors, and appealing to the sense of religious 
and economic ties of Slavic nations. As the 
powerful strategic narrative of the “transfor-
mation” of Central and Eastern Europe is 
slowly fading away and Russia reemerges to 
the position of a global player in propaganda 
games, new attractive strategic narratives 
should be developed by the Western democ-
racies to challenge Russia’s military postur-
ing and destabilizing propaganda attacks.
Applebaum has argued that the consensus 
over the acceptance of the narrative of Rus-
sian decline meant that the West has found 
it difficult to respond to Kremlin’s assertive-
ness.23 Yet Russian kompromat-inspired pro-
paganda has a multiplayer effect—it falls on 
the fertile ground of nationalism, populism, 
and illiberal tendencies in which “post-truth 
politics” or declining respect for facts causes 
cracks in liberal democracies and deepens di-
visions in transatlantic diplomatic relations. 
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Keeping in mind the scale of media capture 
in Russia as well as the changing global me-
dia landscape, Western strategic soft power 
narratives should have a strong digital di-
mension. The United States’ public diplo-
macy needs further investment in digital 
capabilities, and policymakers in the West 
must amplify a strategic soft power narrative 
about their relationship to Russia and high-
light the role of liberal governance within 
that narrative.
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